FOREIGN-MADE UAS AND SECURITY RISKS
By Tyler Dobbs, Interim Executive Director and Senior Director of Government Affairs | tylerd@modelaircraft.org
THE BUREAU OF Industry and Security (BIS), part of the U.S. Department of Commerce, released an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) that seeks public input on the national security risks posed by foreign-made, uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS). In its call for comments, the BIS aims to gather information concerning securing data and communications technology in UAS, particularly those that are sourced from outside of the US. The goal of this rulemaking process is to assess whether there are risks to US national security that require restrictions or regulations for foreign-made UAS and their components.
Because most UAS are foreign made, this proposed rulemaking has the potential to significantly affect model aircraft operators, manufacturers, retailers, and the broader hobbyist community. AMA is actively engaged in the rulemaking process and has submitted public comments to ensure that the concerns of model aircraft hobbyists are addressed, and that the integrity of the hobby is maintained.
It is important to note that the ANPRM is only the first step in a lengthy regulatory process. The primary purpose of the ANPRM is to solicit feedback and gather information about various issues surrounding foreign-made UAS. Based on this input, the BIS will issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), which will include a first draft of the regulations. At that point, there will be another opportunity for public comments and further revisions. After the NPRM, the BIS will adjudicate the comments and, if necessary, revise the proposal before issuing a final rule.
AMA’s Comments on the BIS Notice of Inquiry
In response to the BIS’s inquiry regarding foreign adversary involvement in UAS and potential national security risks, AMA has submitted detailed comments to the Federal Register, stressing the importance of BIS to distinguish between traditional model aircraft and advanced drones that are used for commercial or nonrecreational purposes.
AMA also noted that our members primarily operate non-data-collecting, line-of-sight model (LOS) aircraft that do not pose the same national security risks as advanced UAS. These aircraft are designed to be flown within the operator’s visual LOS, with no advanced navigation or surveillance capabilities.
Traditional model aircraft are not equipped with sophisticated sensors, data storage systems, or advanced autonomous flight technology, all of which are features commonly found in commercial drones. As such, these aircraft are not involved in data collection, illicit remote access, or other security concerns associated with advanced UAS.
AMA raised concerns that the broad application of regulations affecting foreign-made UAS could unintentionally impact traditional model aircraft operators. Many of the components used in model aircraft, such as motors, batteries, and radio transmitters, are sourced from foreign manufacturers. Although the geopolitical context has changed throughout the years, the technology used in traditional model aircraft has remained largely unchanged. The technological advances in model aircraft are modest, consisting of features such as stabilization technology and better radio control frequencies, which do not pose national security risks.
AMA also highlighted the existing regulatory mechanisms that already govern recreational UAS. Under 49 USC 44809, recreational drones are not considered national security threats. Operational oversight for these activities is managed by FAA-recognized community-based organizations (CBOs), such as AMA, and a large number of recreational UAS operations occur at FAA-Recognized Identification Areas (FRIAs), which are vetted for security. Moreover, the FAA’s Remote ID rule provides an added layer of security for those operating UAS outside of recognized locations.
AMA cautioned that any blanket restrictions or bans on foreign-made UAS components could disrupt the operations of hobbyists, educators, and institutions that rely on these parts. Such measures could have a significant economic impact, as seen with the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act, which prohibited the purchase of foreign-made UAS with federal funds. This restriction has already led to the halting of UAS programs in educational settings, including the Civil Air Patrol and Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps.
In its comments, AMA emphasized that national security risks associated with UAS are primarily linked to the software and communication technologies embedded within these systems instead of the hardware itself. AMA suggested that BIS focus its regulatory efforts on addressing the security risks posed by the software rather than imposing broad restrictions on foreign-made UAS and parts. By concentrating on software, BIS can precisely target security threats without inadvertently penalizing those who use UAS for recreational or educational purposes.
AMA expressed its willingness to work with BIS and other relevant authorities to find solutions that balance national security with the rights of hobbyists, educators, and students who enjoy using UAS for noncommercial purposes. The goal is to ensure that UAS regulations do not stifle the safe, responsible, and enjoyable use of model aircraft while also addressing potential security concerns.
AMA remains committed to advocating for the interests of model aircraft enthusiasts and ensuring that the regulatory process does not unduly burden the hobbyist community. As the rulemaking process moves forward, AMA will continue to monitor developments and engage with BIS and Congress to ensure that policies are crafted to both safeguard national security and protect the freedoms of American hobbyists.
